Dear [Name redacted]:

The Office of Inspector General (“OIG”) is writing in response to your request for an advisory opinion on behalf of [name redacted] and [name redacted] (each a “Medigap Plan,” and collectively, the “Medigap Plans”), licensed offerors of Medicare Supplemental Health Insurance (“Medigap”) policies, and [name redacted] (the “PHO”), a preferred hospital organization, regarding a proposal to incentivize the Medigap Plans’ respective policyholders to seek inpatient care from a hospital within the PHO’s network (the “Proposed Arrangement”). Specifically, you have inquired whether the Proposed Arrangement, if undertaken, would constitute grounds for the imposition of sanctions under: the civil monetary penalty provision at section 1128A(a)(7) of the Social Security Act (the “Act”), as that section relates to the commission of acts described in section 1128B(b) of the Act (the “Federal anti-kickback statute”); the civil monetary penalty provision prohibiting inducements to beneficiaries, section 1128A(a)(5) of the Act (the “Beneficiary Inducements CMP”); or the exclusion authority at section 1128(b)(7) of the Act, as that section relates to the commission of acts described in the Federal anti-kickback statute and the Beneficiary Inducements CMP.

The Medigap Plans and the PHO have certified that all of the information provided in the request, including all supplemental submissions, is true and correct and constitutes a complete description of the relevant facts and agreements among the parties in connection with the Proposed Arrangement, and we have relied solely on the facts and information you provided. We have not undertaken an independent investigation of the certified facts and information presented to us by the Medigap Plans and the PHO. This opinion is limited to the relevant facts presented to us by the Medigap Plans and the PHO in connection with the Proposed Arrangement. If material facts have not been disclosed or have been misrepresented, this opinion is without force and effect.
Based on the relevant facts certified in your request for an advisory opinion and supplemental submissions, we conclude that: (i) although the Proposed Arrangement, if undertaken, would generate prohibited remuneration under the Federal anti-kickback statute if the requisite intent were present, the OIG would not impose administrative sanctions on the Medigap Plans or the PHO under sections 1128A(a)(7) or 1128(b)(7) of the Act, as those sections relate to the commission of acts described in the Federal anti-kickback statute; and (ii) although the Proposed Arrangement, if undertaken, would generate prohibited remuneration under the Beneficiary Inducements CMP, the OIG would not impose administrative sanctions on the Medigap Plans or the PHO in connection with the Proposed Arrangement under the Beneficiary Inducements CMP or section 1128(b)(7) of the Act, as that section relates to the commission of acts described in the Beneficiary Inducements CMP.

This opinion may not be relied on by any person other than the Medigap Plans and the PHO, the requestors of this opinion, and is further qualified as set out in Part IV below and in 42 C.F.R. Part 1008.

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

A. Discount on Policyholders’ Deductibles

The Medigap Plans are wholly owned subsidiaries of a single parent company. The Medigap Plans’ policies cover, among other things, the Medicare Part A deductible that may be incurred by their respective Medigap policyholders (“Policyholders”) during an inpatient hospital stay. The Medigap Plans both propose to participate in an arrangement with the PHO, which has contracts with hospitals throughout the country (“Network Hospitals”).

Through the Medigap Plans’ proposed arrangement with the PHO, each Network Hospital would provide a discount on the Medicare Part A inpatient deductible that the Medigap Plans otherwise

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1 We use “person” herein to include persons, as referenced in the Federal anti-kickback statute and Beneficiary Inducements CMP, as well as individuals and entities, as referenced in the exclusion authority at section 1128(b)(7) of the Act.

2 Insurers offering a Medigap policy are private insurance companies. In exchange for a premium payment, their Medigap policies provide various benefits to Medicare beneficiaries and may cover certain health care costs that Medicare Part A and Part B do not cover, like all or part of the Medicare Part A deductible. See Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services, Choosing a Medigap Policy: A Guide to Health Insurance for People with Medicare (Feb. 2020), available at https://www.medicare.gov/Pubs/pdf/02110-medicare-medigap-guide.pdf.

3 Under the Proposed Arrangement, the discount on the Medicare Part A inpatient deductible offered by a Network Hospital to the Medigap Plans could be as high as 100 percent. While the
would cover for any Policyholder. The discount would be established in advance, pursuant to a written agreement between the PHO and each of its Network Hospitals, and again documented in a separate written agreement between the PHO and each Medigap Plan. The PHO certified that, under the Proposed Arrangement, each Network Hospital’s discount on the Medicare Part A inpatient deductible would be applied uniformly to all Policyholders for a term of at least one year. Neither the PHO nor any Network Hospital would provide anything else of value to the Medigap Plans.

As represented by the PHO, any accredited, Medicare-certified hospital is eligible to become a Network Hospital if it: (i) meets the licensing and other requirements of applicable state law; and (ii) agrees to discount the Medicare Part A inpatient deductible costs on behalf of all licensed offerors of Medigap policies that contract with the PHO, including the Medigap Plans.

B. Policyholder Premium Credit

Under the Proposed Arrangement, the Medigap Plans would offer a $100 premium credit to each Policyholder who selects a Network Hospital for a Medicare Part A-covered inpatient stay, subject to the frequency limitations described further below. The premium credit would be applied to the next premium payment due to the Policyholder’s Medigap Plan after the Policyholder’s applicable inpatient stay and would be in the form of a reduction in the amount the Policyholder would owe. In nearly all circumstances, the premium credit would not be in the form of a check, deposit, or other affirmative payment from the Medigap Plans to the Policyholder.

Policyholders would be eligible to receive only one $100 premium credit per Medicare Part A benefit period. A benefit period under Medicare Part A starts with the first day on which a Medicare beneficiary is furnished inpatient hospital or extended care services by a hospital or a discount offered could vary by Network Hospital, it would not vary based on the volume of Policyholder claims.

4 The PHO certified that there would be no financial arrangement between it and any Network Hospital. In particular, the PHO certified that the Network Hospitals would not furnish remuneration to the PHO, directly or indirectly, to be included in the PHO’s network of hospitals.

5 The Medicare Part A payment rate for inpatient services is unaffected by beneficiary cost sharing.

6 Under the Proposed Arrangement, if a Policyholder’s premium payment is less than the $100 premium credit, the Medigap Plans would apply the amount of credit needed to reduce the premium payment due to zero, and the remaining balance would be applied to the Policyholder’s next premium payment.

7 In the limited circumstances where a Policyholder has no future premium payment, e.g., the Policyholder cancels their policy, the applicable Medigap Plan would issue a check for the remaining balance of the premium credit to the Policyholder.
skilled nursing facility (“SNF”), respectively, and ends after 60 consecutive days during which the 
beneficiary was not an inpatient of either a hospital or a SNF.⁸ The Medigap Plans acknowledged 
that, in very rare circumstances, Policyholders could receive up to five $100 premium credits per 
year. Nevertheless, the Medigap Plans certified that only a small minority of Policyholders 
typically would undergo more than one, and an even smaller minority would undergo more than 
two, inpatient admissions in a single year. Therefore, the vast majority of Policyholders would 
receive only one $100 premium credit per year under the Proposed Arrangement.⁹

The Proposed Arrangement would not affect the liability of any Policyholder for payment 
obligations stemming from Medicare Part A-covered inpatient services, whether provided by a 
Network Hospital or any other hospital. Whether a Policyholder is admitted to a Network Hospital 
or a hospital that is not a Network Hospital, the Policyholder would not be responsible for paying 
any part of the Part A inpatient deductible, as provided for under the Medigap Plans’ respective 
policies, nor would the Policyholder be subject to any financial penalty (e.g., an increased 
premium) for not selecting a Network Hospital for Medicare Part A-covered inpatient care.

While the Medigap Plans would not advertise the Proposed Arrangement, in whole or in part, to 
potential enrollees, they would provide information about the Network Hospitals and the premium 
credit to Policyholders upon enrollment and through periodic mailings thereafter. In all such 
materials, the Medigap Plans certified that they would make clear that a Policyholder’s use of a 
hospital that is not a Network Hospital would: (i) have no effect on the Policyholder’s liability for 
any costs covered by the Medigap Plans’ respective policies; and (ii) not result in a financial 
penalty (e.g., an increased premium) to the Policyholder. The PHO certified that it would not, 
acting by itself or in conjunction with the Network Hospitals, advertise any aspect of the Proposed 
Arrangement to Policyholders or potential enrollees of the Medigap Plans.

C. The PHO’s Administrative Fee

The PHO would enter into a written agreement with each Medigap Plan pursuant to which the 
Medigap Plans would pay the PHO a monthly administrative fee as compensation for establishing 
the hospital network and arranging for the Network Hospitals to discount the Medicare Part A 
inpatient deductible. The administrative fee would be a percentage-based fee; specifically, the PHO 
would receive a percentage of the aggregate savings that each Medigap Plan would realize from the

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⁸ Section 1861(a) of the Act; see also Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services, Medicare General 
Information, Eligibility, and Entitlement Manual, Ch. 3, § 10.4, available at 

⁹ The Medigap Plans certified that they would not use the Proposed Arrangement, and in particular 
the offer of a premium credit, as a vehicle to encourage inappropriate utilization of any item or 
service that may be furnished to Policyholders during an inpatient stay at a Network Hospital. 
Indeed, as payors that assume financial responsibility for certain expenses incurred by 
Policyholders, it generally would not be in their financial interest to do so. Moreover, the Medigap 
Plans represented that patients generally do not control whether they are admitted as an inpatient 
because this is a clinical decision.
Network Hospitals’ discounts on each Medigap Plan’s respective Policyholders’ Medicare Part A inpatient deductibles in a given month. As such, the monthly fee would vary by: (i) the number of Policyholder claims for which Network Hospitals provided a discount on the Medicare Part A inpatient deductible; and (ii) the amount of the discount on the Medicare Part A inpatient deductible provided by the Network Hospitals, as established in their respective written agreements with the PHO.

As certified by the Medigap Plans and the PHO, the PHO’s administrative fee would be consistent with fair market value. The Medigap Plans further certified that they would not pass on or otherwise shift the cost of the PHO’s administrative fee to any Federal health care program.

II. LEGAL ANALYSIS

A. Law

1. Federal Anti-Kickback Statute

The Federal anti-kickback statute makes it a criminal offense to knowingly and willfully offer, pay, solicit, or receive any remuneration to induce, or in return for, the referral of an individual to a person for the furnishing of, or arranging for the furnishing of, any item or service reimbursable under a Federal health care program. The statute’s prohibition also extends to remuneration to induce, or in return for, the purchasing, leasing, or ordering of, or arranging for or recommending the purchasing, leasing, or ordering of, any good, facility, service, or item reimbursable by a Federal health care program. For purposes of the Federal anti-kickback statute, “remuneration” includes the transfer of anything of value, directly or indirectly, overtly or covertly, in cash or in kind.

The statute has been interpreted to cover any arrangement where one purpose of the remuneration is to induce referrals for items or services reimbursable by a Federal health care program. Violation of the statute constitutes a felony punishable by a maximum fine of $100,000, imprisonment up to 10 years, or both. Conviction also will lead to exclusion from Federal health care programs, including Medicare and Medicaid. When a person commits an act described in section 1128B(b) of the Act, the OIG may initiate administrative proceedings to impose civil monetary penalties on such

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10 We are precluded by statute from opining on whether fair market value shall be or was paid for goods, services, or property. See Section 1128D(b)(3)(A) of the Act.

11 Section 1128B(b) of the Act.

12 Id.

13 E.g., United States v. Nagelvoort, 856 F.3d 1117 (7th Cir. 2017); United States v. McClatchey, 217 F.3d 823 (10th Cir. 2000); United States v. Davis, 132 F.3d 1092 (5th Cir. 1998); United States v. Kats, 871 F.2d 105 (9th Cir. 1989); United States v. Greber, 760 F.2d 68 (3d Cir. 1985).
person under section 1128A(a)(7) of the Act. The OIG also may initiate administrative proceedings to exclude such person from Federal health care programs under section 1128(b)(7) of the Act.

Congress has developed several statutory exceptions to the Federal anti-kickback statute.\(^{14}\) In addition, the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services has promulgated safe harbor regulations that, if met, would protect persons from sanctions under the Federal anti-kickback statute.\(^{15}\) However, safe harbor protection is afforded only to those arrangements that precisely meet all of the conditions set forth in the safe harbor. Compliance with a safe harbor is voluntary. Arrangements that do not comply with a safe harbor are evaluated on a case-by-case basis.

2. **Civil Monetary Penalties Law**

The Beneficiary Inducements CMP provides for the imposition of civil monetary penalties against any person who offers or transfers remuneration to a Medicare or State health care program beneficiary that the person knows or should know is likely to influence the beneficiary’s selection of a particular provider, practitioner, or supplier for the order or receipt of any item or service for which payment may be made, in whole or in part, by Medicare or a State health care program. The OIG also may initiate administrative proceedings to exclude such person from Federal health care programs. Section 1128A(i)(6) of the Act defines “remuneration” for purposes of the Beneficiary Inducements CMP as including “transfers of items or services for free or for other than fair market value.”

**B. Analysis**

The Proposed Arrangement would involve three distinct streams of remuneration: (i) the Network Hospitals’ discounts to the Medigap Plans on Policyholders’ Medicare Part A inpatient deductibles; (ii) the premium credit offered by the Medigap Plans to Policyholders; and (iii) the administrative fee paid by each Medigap Plan to the PHO. While all three streams of remuneration would implicate the Federal anti-kickback statute and one—the premium credit offered by the Medigap Plans to Policyholders—also would implicate the Beneficiary Inducements CMP, for the combination of reasons discussed below, we conclude that the Proposed Arrangement poses a sufficiently low risk of fraud and abuse under the Federal anti-kickback statute and we would not impose administrative sanctions under the Beneficiary Inducements CMP in connection with the Proposed Arrangement.

1. **Discount on Policyholders’ Deductibles and the Premium Credit**
   
a. **Federal Anti-Kickback Statute**

Both the Network Hospitals’ discounts on Policyholders’ Medicare Part A inpatient deductibles and the Medigap Plans’ offer of a premium credit would constitute remuneration—the former to the

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\(^{14}\) Section 1128B(b)(3) of the Act.

\(^{15}\) 42 C.F.R. § 1001.952.
Medigap Plans and the latter to Policyholders. Likewise, both streams of remuneration could influence the referrals of Federal health care program business. The discount on Policyholders’ deductibles would be designed to induce the Medigap Plans to arrange for or recommend the provision of federally reimbursable items and services by the Network Hospitals on behalf of their Policyholders. The premium credit could influence: (i) potential enrollees to select the Medigap Plans; (ii) Policyholders to re-enroll in the Medigap Plans; and (iii) Policyholders to select a Network Hospital as their inpatient hospital provider. Accordingly, both the Network Hospitals’ discounts on Policyholders’ deductibles and the Medigap Plans’ offer of the premium credit implicate the Federal anti-kickback statute.

No safe harbor under the Federal anti-kickback statute would be available for either stream of remuneration. For example, the safe harbor protecting certain price reductions offered by health care providers to their contracted health plans would not apply to the Network Hospitals’ discounts on the inpatient deductibles. There is no written agreement between either of the Medigap Plans and the Network Hospitals, as would be required by the safe harbor, and each Network Hospital’s price reduction would be with respect to only a specific part of its charges for Medicare covered inpatient hospital services, i.e., the Medicare Part A inpatient deductible, not its total charges. As another example, the safe harbor protecting price reductions offered to eligible managed care organizations by its contractors also would not apply because the Medigap Plans would not meet the safe harbor definition of “eligible managed care organization.”

However, for the combination of reasons set forth below, we find the Network Hospitals’ discounts on Policyholders’ Medicare Part A inpatient deductibles and the Medigap Plans’ offer of the premium credit pose a minimal risk of fraud and abuse under the Federal anti-kickback statute.

First, we believe it is unlikely that these two streams of remuneration would result in overutilization of health care items or services or pose a risk of increased costs to Federal health care programs. The Medigap Plans are offerors of Medigap policies, with financial responsibility for all Policyholder costs that their policies may cover. Because it is generally in the Medigap Plans’ financial interest to ensure appropriate utilization and costs, we believe it is unlikely that they would use either the offer of a premium credit to their Policyholders or savings realized from the Network Hospitals’ discounts on the Medicare Part A inpatient deductibles to promote inappropriate utilization by their Policyholders. Moreover, we believe it is unlikely the premium credit would serve as an improper inducement to Policyholders to utilize inpatient care considering:

16 See 42 C.F.R. § 1001.952(m).

17 See id.

18 See 42 C.F.R. § 1001.952(t).

19 We further note that the Network Hospitals’ discounts on Policyholders’ Medicare Part A inpatient deductibles would not affect Medicare Part A payments for inpatient care. Medicare Part A payments for inpatient services are unaffected by beneficiary cost sharing.
(i) that, as the Medigap Plans represented, patients generally do not control whether they are admitted as an inpatient because this is a clinical decision; and (ii) the form of the premium credit (i.e., the premium credit would reduce the amount the Policyholder would owe to the applicable Medigap Plan rather than being an affirmative payment, such as a check or cash deposit into the Policyholder’s bank account).

Second, the potential for patient harm that may be posed by the Network Hospitals’ discounts on Policyholders’ Medicare Part A inpatient deductibles and the Medigap Plans’ offer of a premium credit is minimal. The Network Hospitals’ discounts on the Medicare Part A inpatient deductibles would apply universally to all Policyholders and would not be limited by discriminatory eligibility criteria, such as length of stay or a Policyholder’s disease state. Likewise, patient choice would not be impacted, as Policyholders could elect to receive care at a hospital that is not a Network Hospital without any increase in cost-sharing obligations or premiums by the Medigap Plans.

Third, we believe these two streams of remuneration would be unlikely to significantly impact competition. Considering first the impact on competition among insurers offering Medigap policies, we rely on the Medigap Plans’ certification that they would not advertise any aspect of the Proposed Arrangement to potential enrollees. While we acknowledge the potential for the premium credit to induce Policyholders to re-enroll in a policy offered by the Medigap Plans in future policy years, we believe this risk is mitigated because Policyholders would receive the premium credit only if: (i) they required one or more inpatient stays in a policy year, which may not happen or be foreseeable; and (ii) they selected a Network Hospital for their inpatient stay(s). Considering the potential impact on competition among inpatient providers, we note that, under the Proposed Arrangement, the Medigap Plans would not limit Policyholders’ choice of inpatient hospitals to the Network Hospitals. Policyholders would continue to be able to select any inpatient hospital, irrespective of whether it was a Network Hospital, without any impact on their cost-sharing obligations associated with their Part A inpatient deductible or any financial penalty (e.g., an increased premium). We further highlight the PHO’s certification that it would not advertise the Proposed Arrangement, in whole or in part, and that any interested hospital is eligible to join its network provided the hospital is Medicare-certified and has: (i) met the licensing and other requirements of applicable state law; and (ii) agreed to discount the Medicare Part A inpatient deductible costs on behalf of all licensed offerors of Medigap policies that contract with the PHO.

b. **Beneficiary Inducements CMP**

Under the Proposed Arrangement, the Medigap Plans’ offer of a premium credit to qualifying Policyholders also would implicate the Beneficiary Inducements CMP. In particular, the Medigap

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20 See also Medicare and State Health Care Programs: Fraud and Abuse; OIG Anti-Kickback Provisions, 56 Fed. Reg. 35,952, 35,962 (July 29, 1991) (“A routine waiver [of inpatient cost-sharing obligations] will not likely increase patient demand for these services, since beneficiaries cannot admit themselves, and hospital overnight stays are inherently undesirable from a patient’s perspective.”).
Plans’ offer of the premium credit could influence a Policyholder to select a Network Hospital for federally reimbursable items and services. While there is no exception to the definition of “remuneration” under the Beneficiary Inducements CMP that would protect this stream of remuneration, for the reasons detailed above, we would not impose administrative sanctions under the Beneficiary Inducements CMP in connection with the Medigap Plans’ offer of the premium credit to their Policyholders.

2. The PHO’s Administrative Fee

The administrative fee each Medigap Plan would pay to the PHO under the Proposed Arrangement also would implicate the Federal anti-kickback statute because such payments would be in exchange for the PHO arranging for the provision of federally reimbursable inpatient services furnished by its Network Hospitals to Policyholders at a reduced rate. No safe harbor would be available to protect the administrative fee, including the personal services and management contracts and outcomes-based payment arrangements safe harbor, because the methodology for determining the PHO’s compensation would be determined in a manner that directly takes into account the volume or value of business otherwise generated between the parties for which payment may be made in whole or in part under Medicare.

Nevertheless, based on the totality of the facts and circumstances, we find the Medigap Plans’ payment of the administrative fee to the PHO would be sufficiently low risk under the Federal anti-kickback statute. The Medigap Plans and the PHO certified that the PHO’s administrative fee would be consistent with fair market value. In addition, the Proposed Arrangement is distinguishable from certain other arrangements where compensation is determined in a manner that takes into account the volume or value of Federal health care program business because we believe there is a low risk that the methodology for calculating the administrative fee would drive overutilization of Federal health care items or services or result in increased costs to any Federal health care program. In reaching this conclusion, we rely upon the following: (i) the PHO’s administrative fee, while tied to the volume or value of referrals between each Medigap Plan and the Network Hospitals, ultimately reflects a percentage of the savings realized by the applicable Medigap Plan, not revenue generated by the Network Hospitals; (ii) it would be contrary to the Medigap Plans’ financial interest, as offerors of Medigap policies with financial responsibility for the cost of certain items and services furnished to their Policyholders, to drive overutilization of inpatient hospital services paid for by Medicare Part A; and (iii) the Medigap Plans certified that they would not pass on or otherwise shift the cost of the PHO’s administrative fee to any Federal

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21 The Beneficiary Inducements CMP would not apply to the potential for the premium credit to induce potential enrollees or Policyholders to select the Medigap Plans. See, e.g., Publication of the OIG’s Compliance Program Guidance for Medicare+Choice Organizations Offering Coordinated Care Plans, 64 Fed. Reg. 61,893, 61,902 (Nov. 15, 1999) (“It is our view that organizations that provide incentives to Federal health care program beneficiaries to enroll in a plan are not offering remuneration to induce the enrollees to use a particular provider, practitioner or supplier.”)

22 See 42 C.F.R. § 1001.952(d)(1).
health care program. We further highlight the PHO’s certification that it would not (acting by itself or in conjunction with its Network Hospitals) advertise the Proposed Arrangement, thereby limiting the potential for the PHO or the Network Hospitals to impact Policyholder referrals to the Network Hospitals and, in turn, the PHO’s administrative fee.

III. CONCLUSION

Based on the relevant facts certified in your request for an advisory opinion and supplemental submissions, we conclude that: (i) although the Proposed Arrangement, if undertaken, would generate prohibited remuneration under the Federal anti-kickback statute if the requisite intent were present, the OIG would not impose administrative sanctions on the Medigap Plans or the PHO under sections 1128A(a)(7) or 1128(b)(7) of the Act, as those sections relate to the commission of acts described in the Federal anti-kickback statute; and (ii) although the Proposed Arrangement, if undertaken, would generate prohibited remuneration under the Beneficiary Inducements CMP, the OIG would not impose administrative sanctions on the Medigap Plans or the PHO in connection with the Proposed Arrangement under the Beneficiary Inducements CMP or section 1128(b)(7) of the Act, as that section relates to the commission of acts described in the Beneficiary Inducements CMP.

IV. LIMITATIONS

- This advisory opinion is limited in scope to the Arrangement and has no applicability to any other arrangements that may have been disclosed or referenced in your request for an advisory opinion or supplemental submissions.

- This advisory opinion is issued only to the Medigap Plans and the PHO. This advisory opinion has no application to, and cannot be relied upon by, any other person.

- This advisory opinion may not be introduced into evidence by a person other than the Medigap Plans or the PHO to prove that the person did not violate the provisions of sections 1128, 1128A, or 1128B of the Act or any other law.

- This advisory opinion applies only to the statutory provisions specifically addressed in the analysis above. We express no opinion herein with respect to the application of any other Federal, state, or local statute, rule, regulation, ordinance, or other law that may be applicable to the Proposed Arrangement, including, without limitation, the physician self-referral law, section 1877 of the Act (or that provision’s application to the Medicaid program at section 1903(s) of the Act).

- This advisory opinion will not bind or obligate any agency other than the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services.

- This advisory opinion is limited in scope to the Proposed Arrangement and has no applicability to other arrangements, even those that appear similar in nature or scope.
We express no opinion herein regarding the liability of any person under the False Claims Act or other legal authorities for any improper billing, claims submission, cost reporting, or related conduct.

This opinion is also subject to any additional limitations set forth at 42 C.F.R. Part 1008. The OIG will not proceed against the Medigap Plans or the PHO with respect to any action that is part of the Proposed Arrangement taken in good faith reliance upon this advisory opinion, as long as all of the material facts have been fully, completely, and accurately presented, and the Proposed Arrangement in practice comports with the information provided. The OIG reserves the right to reconsider the questions and issues raised in this advisory opinion and, where the public interest requires, to rescind, modify, or terminate this opinion. In the event that this advisory opinion is modified or terminated, the OIG will not proceed against the Medigap Plans or the PHO with respect to any action that is part of the Proposed Arrangement taken in good faith reliance upon this advisory opinion, where all of the relevant facts were fully, completely, and accurately presented and where such action was promptly discontinued upon notification of the modification or termination of this advisory opinion. An advisory opinion may be rescinded only if the relevant and material facts have not been fully, completely, and accurately disclosed to the OIG.

Sincerely,

/Robert K. DeConti/

Robert K. DeConti
Assistant Inspector General for Legal Affairs